INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

DOI 10.51582/interconf.7-8.05.2021.004

Kuderbayeva Arailym Muratkanovna
Master of International Relations
Executive Assistant to the Provost and GDP, NJSC KIMEP University
Republic of Kazakhstan

REVIEW OF THE SEVENTH EDITION OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY: PATTERN AND PROCESS

Abstract. The article presents key points of the reviewed book and introduces central ideas written by the authors.

Keywords: American Foreign Policy, sole power, neo-isolationism, nation’s, Interest, dominant player

The seventh edition of American Foreign Policy: Pattern and Process written by significant Professors: Eugene R. Wittkopf, Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and James M. Scott reflects a new vision of American Foreign Policy in twenty first century. This book was accomplished regarding to contribution of wise ideas, suggestions and insights of many other professionals, scholars and critics, including students’ opinions which made this book, undoubtedly, unique and effective teaching tool in political science. Structure of this edition remained as other previous books, in order to make an analysis of conceptual framework of American Foreign Policy were chosen five sources: the external (global) environment, the societal opinion and political culture, the governmental setting in which policy making occurs, the roles maintained by policy makers, and the individual characteristics of foreign policy-making elites.

American power extends beyond traditional measures, America’s “second” century will still be profoundly shaped by three global wars of the twentieth century.
Three times in eighty years—in World War I, World War II, and the Cold War—the world experienced international contests for power and position of global proportions and with global consequences, forcing the US to confront its role as its political, economic, and military importance grew. World War II was geographically more widespread and military more destructive than World War I. And it transformed world politics irrevocably. The place of the United States in the structure of world politics also was altered dramatically as it emerged from the war with unparalleled capabilities. World War II not only propelled the United States into the status of an emergent superpower but also transformed the way it responded to the challenges of the postwar world. Ironically, the end of the Cold War removed the very things that gave structure and purpose to post-World War II American foreign policy: fear of communism, fear of the Soviet Union, and a determination to contain both. Even as the United States debates its global role, forces unleashed during the past decade are dramatically reshaping the global environment.

Globalization refers to the rapid intensification and integration of states’ economies not only in terms of markets but also ideas, information, and technology, which is having a profound impact on political, social, and cultural relations across borders. Domestically, globalization “is exposing a deep fault line between groups who have the skills and mobility to flourish in global markets and those who either don’t have these advantages or perceive the expansion of unregulated markets as inimical to social stability and deeply held norms.” There are other troublesome developments during the last decade of the twentieth century; including widespread international conflict fed by ethnic and religious feuds often centuries old, and transnational terrorist networks lashing out against the dominant power of the United States and the pervasiveness of its culture.

Thus, as the forces that will define the twenty-first century unfold, American policy makers must deal with global trends and transformations that both challenge and transcend the nation-state, the very foundation of the contemporary world political order. Despite, all commonalities, it can be predicted that none of the competing strategies will guide American foreign policy in the new millennium in quite the way its advocates would like. The reason is simple: American foreign
CURRENT ISSUES AND PROSPECTS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH

policy is not the product of a mechanical calculus of the nation’s interests. Instead, determination of those interests in the product of a complex political process anchored in tradition and colored by contemporary developments at home and abroad. If we are to anticipate the shape of American foreign policy in the new century we must understand much about the world, about the United States and its system of government, about the behavior of political leaders and others responsible for its foreign policy, and about the competing world views that animate the American people and their leaders. We must also understand how these forces have interacted in the past to create today’s American foreign policy, as the United States finds itself bound by history even as many of the fears and strategies that once shaped it have dissipated. These are our purposes in this book.

As we saw in Chapter 1, primacy, neo-isolationism, selective engagement, and cooperative security figure prominently in the most recent exchange of ideas as the United States enters a new century and a new millennium. Primacists (Maynes’ controllers) remain committed to maintenance of U.S. hegemony. Neo-isolationists remain a significant voice in the debate about America’s foreign policy priorities. As we saw in Chapter 1, primacists/controllers and conservative neo-isolationists continue to form a natural coalition around a common theme, even though they arrive there by different routes. “Each group wants to make sure that America remains the sole arbiter of its own fate, the former by keeping others subservient, the latter by staying out of their quarrels” (Maynes 2001).

The external source category refers to the attributes of the international system and to the characteristics and behaviors of the state and non-state actors comprising it. It includes all “aspects of America’s external environment or any actions occurring abroad that condition or otherwise influence the choices made by its officials.” The role that the United States will play in shaping the world of the twenty-first century now unfolding is uncertain. As the world’s sole superpower, the United States has a greater capacity than anyone to create a world order that once more is compatible with its interests and values. Paradoxically, however, the United States also today finds itself burdened with responsibilities. The institutions it promoted and once supported without reservation are sometimes the unwelcome
symbols of an inhospitable and intractable international system. Historically the United States has responded to external challenges either with detachment or through assertiveness. American Leadership in the world political economy and in the international political system has long been prized not only in the United States but also in other countries. Primacy, aggressive unilateralism, hardline, hyperpower, neomercantilism - these are among the phrases that other states often associate with an arrogance of power. Globalization has enhanced the soft power of the United States. It has also opened states’ boarders to forces over which they sometimes have little control. The United States is not immune from the vanishing boarders phenomenon, as we have seen.

The societal source category comprises those characteristics of the domestic social and political system that shape its orientation toward the world. Because American foreign policy is deeply rooted in its history and culture, the impact of societal forces is potentially strong. “Democratic” policy formations a political myth. Foreign policy making under such conditions is little more than a reflection of the motives and interests of a privileged few. James MCCormick (1998), a preeminent scholar of Congress and foreign policy, suggests several that have had the effect of encouraging greater interest group influence. Among them are (1) congressional reforms that have encouraged greater interest group access; (2) the growth of partisan and ideological divisions among the American people, which have stimulated interest group interests and enhanced opportunities to exercise foreign policy influence; (3) the rise of new groups with foreign policy concerns - “foreign lobbies, some religious lobbies, think tanks, and scattered single-issue lobbies”; (4) the increased salience of trade and related issues compared with traditional national security issues; (5) a changing focus of decision making away from the small groups that make crisis decisions toward broader involvement by others interested in structural decisions (for example, goals and tactics of defense policy); and (6) procedural requirements imposed on the executive by Congress that have opened new points of access to others seeking to shape foreign policy preferences.

The communications industry-print, radio, and television-plays two pivotal roles. First, public attitudes may be influenced (created, some would say) by the
information the media disseminates. Second, the behavior of policy makers themselves may be affected by the news the media reports and by the images of the world it conveys. From either perspective, the media is an important link in the causal chain that transmits Americans’ values, beliefs, and preferences into the foreign policy process. Indeed, it seemingly is in a position to exert a potent influence on the shape of American foreign policy itself. The media plays a powerful role in American society. Newspapers also suffer a competitive disadvantage compared with television. Seven of ten Americans report that television is their primary source of all news. If television challenges the print media, the Internet challenges TV. Today the Internet is a major source of news for many Americans. An exception to the comparatively scant attention other media gives to foreign affairs is the coverage it receives in the national newspapers of record, sometimes called the prestige press. The advent of television encouraged that process, as presidents could largely control their access to the media, whether through periodic press conferences or releasing “breaking news” that would break just in time for the evening news broadcasts. Most Americans are uninterested in and ill-informed about foreign affairs. Research grounded in social psychology shows that most people do not easily change their beliefs. Selective perception is also a pervasive human tendency: People search for “comfortable” information that “fits” with preexisting beliefs; they screen out or reject information with which they disagree. First, television may explain the decline of confidence in the nation’s institutional leadership witnessed during recent decades. Second, members of the inadvertent audience, being uninterested, are unlikely to have convictions as strong about issues as do those who regularly follow foreign policy concerns. “When people with weak opinions are exposed to new information, the impact of that information is very strong. They form new opinions, and if the information they receive is negative or critical, their opinions will develop in that direction” (Schneider 1982). Still, “there is no evidence that television changes the nature of the public’s concerns in the area of foreign policy,” observes Schneider (1984). “These concerns remain what they always have been: peace and strength. Television simply intensifies these concerns and creates more negative and unstable public moods.” The remarkably rapid spread
of the Internet in the past decade and its growing significance as a source of news inevitably challenges further our ideas about the role of the media in the opinion-policy process. We already know that the Internet, like television, challenges long-standing theories about how attitudes change. Members of the mass public do not actually sit down and exchange ideas with governing elites or those close to policy makers, of course. Instead, ideas become meaningful only after they have been transmitted to members of the mass public from opinion leaders such as teachers, members of the clergy, local political leaders, and others who have an above-average interest in public affairs and occupy positions allowing them to communicate frequently with others. On the other hand, those at the top of the public opinion pyramid-policy makers, policy influencers, and the attentive public-often rely heavily on the information the communications industry disseminates. The relationship between the media and policy makers is both subtle and complex, with no easy conclusions about who influences whom in what circumstances. Television has quickened the pace of news and inevitably shaped the way policy makers use the media and respond to events abroad, but it by no means determines American foreign policy. It is clear nonetheless that the fourth estate is a powerful institution that affects multiple facets of American political life. Particularly in the foreign policy domain, policy makers nonetheless act as though voters make choices on the basis of their policy preferences. Hence, they pay attention to the anticipated responses of voters in shaping their policy choices. So, elections do matter, particularly in shaping the character of the personnel a new president appoints to key positions in a new administration.

The United States is a society-dominant political system, the ability of the president to work his will in Congress ultimately will be influenced by the support his policies enjoy among the American people. At a time of peace and prosperity and no imminent external threat, the American people’s definition of national priorities understandably is driven by domestic concerns.

There is a constant interaction between policy makers and the public, elites and masses alike, much of it promoted through the media and the electoral system. American foreign policy emerges out of this continuing interaction. Still, policy
makers and other elites enjoy a competitive advantage in shaping the agenda and are ultimately responsible for final decisions; important caveats and qualifications must be attached to the role that mass preferences and private interests play in shaping policy. Still, we have seen that societal factors do indeed intrude upon the policy-making process and thus serve as a source of American foreign policy.

Societal factors explain more about the process of formulating American policies toward the external environment than about the objectives of those actions and the particular means chosen to achieve them. Moreover, it is difficult to isolate causal connections between particular actions abroad. Thus, societal factors rarely if ever “determine” foreign policy actions. Instead, they exert influence primarily as part of the context within which decisions are formulated. In particular, they operate more as forces constraining foreign policy than as forces stimulating radical departures from the past.

The governmental source category refers to those aspects of a governmental source category refers “to those aspects of a government’s structure that limit or enhance the foreign policy choices made by decision makers” (Rosenau 1980). Variations in public opinion, involvement of interest groups, and the media—all of which can stem from the international environment, policy context, and other sources—can also affect the president’s ability to lead. Presidential leadership in twenty-first century foreign policy is not a foregone conclusion. Certainly, continued and direct White House involvement in foreign policy is now a permanent feature of the governmental structures responsible for making and executing American foreign policy. There is a distinction between executive branch agencies comprising the second concentric circle of policy making and the presidential subsystem, which makes up the innermost circle. The president and his closest advisers must depend on them and on their thousands of career professionals to manage America’s day-to-day foreign relations and to implement the decisions of the president and presidential advisers. Hence the scope and magnitude of the responsibilities of major organizations in the second concentric circle require scrutiny.

The executive departments and agencies that comprise the foreign affairs government are so numerous and multifaceted that no brief description could
adequately capture either the breadth of their interests or the depth of their involvement in matters of foreign policy making-decision making by and within a disparate set of exceedingly large and complex organizational structures. Effecting control over them and dealing with the consequences of their behavior are important presidential concerns for political, legal, and other reasons. It is, of course, the case that foreign policy is not solely determined by the White House and executive branch agencies. As we have seen in previous chapters, president’s ability to exert foreign policy leadership is uneven. Some of that variability can be traced to Congress. Congress cannot replace the president as the central actor in American foreign policy making, but it often influences, shapes, and occasionally even determines foreign policy.

Congress is granted more extensive responsibilities, including the general legislative power, the “power of the purse,” the powers to declare war, to raise and support armies, to provide and maintain a Navy, to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces, and to organize, arm, discipline, and call forth the militia. Congress is also to regulate international commerce and immigration, to define and punish piracies, to grant letters of marque and reprisal, and to make rules concerning capture on land and water. Each actor also has access to other levers of policy influence. Indeed, because there are so many avenues of foreign policy influence, these congressional actors have far more routes to policy influence than the Constitution’s formal assignments of responsibilities suggests. Because of its access to powerful of influence such as those discussed previously, Congress can, at times, play an assertive foreign policy role. However, as an institution, Congress suffers from some key disadvantages when it comes to competing affectively with the president over the direction of the nation’s foreign relations. Three interrelated factors-parochialism, organizational weaknesses, and lack of expertise-help to explain these disadvantages and shed light on the reasons that members of Congress frequently fail to utilize its apparently powerful and numerous avenues of foreign policy influence. Congress has virtually no role in crisis decision making, but it is a central component of the exceedingly complex institutional labyrinth in which structural and strategic policy is made. We should
expect more presidential leadership on some policy issues but less on others. The president may well remain the leading partner-if not always the senior partner-in devising responses to the challenges and opportunities the nation now faces.

The role source category refers to the impact of the office on the behavior of its occupant. Roles are important because decision makers indisputably are influenced by the socially prescribed behaviors and legally sanctioned norms attached to the positions they occupy. Because the positions the occupy shape their behavior, policy outcomes are inevitably influenced by the roles extant in the policy making arena.

First, the very size of the government—the incredibly complex organizational structures into which the millions of federal employees fit and the maze of channels through which innovative ideas must pass before they become new policies—is likely to work against policy change and the formulation of new purposes. Second, the politics of policy making within this maze of multiple and often overlapping institutions is more conductive to the stars quo than to change. Money and personnel mean political power.

Role theory posits that positions and the processes, rather than the characteristics of the people who decide, influence the behavior and choices of those responsible for making and executing the nation’s foreign policy. These pressures, which include personal and peer pressures as well as those of “the boss,” affect both attitudes and actions. They influence anyone filling a particular role, regardless of personnel preferences. Thus, every individual behaves similarly to others who have occupied the same role. Furthermore, changes in policy presumably result from changes in role conceptions rather than from changes in the individuals who occupy the roles. Individuals are not unimportant, from this perspective, but the institutional roles that individuals occupy mold they behavior and constrain their decision-making latitude. There are different types of decision makers (climbers, conservers, zealots, advocates, and statesmen) with different values and goals (power, personal security, advancement of a few core goals, loyalty to the organizations, desire for the best possible policy) who will react to and manipulate roles in different ways.
National decision-making model, American foreign policy results from a deliberate intellectual process in which the central figures carefully choose what is best for the country and select tactics appropriately designed to promote its national interests.

The rational actor model treats the nation-state as if it were a unitary-actor, a single, homogeneous entity, and presumes that all policy makers go through the same rational thought processes to make value-maximizing choices to define national interests and identify options. “Rational” goal selection, therefore, frequently means choosing the lesser of two evils. For instance, if a leader’s goals include (1) normalizing relations with China and (2) providing Taiwan with advanced weapons to ensure its continued independence, one interest may be achieved only at the expense of the other. Or consider the goals of (1) promoting democracy in other countries and (2) supporting the principle of national self-determination. The former may undermine the latter by rationalizing suppression of minority ethnic groups.

Rational decision making is compromised most by the way foreign policy choices are actually reached. Before we jump to the conclusion that bureaucratic decision making is a modern panacea, these theoretical propositions, as with the rational actor model, tell us how bureaucratic decision making should occur but not necessarily how it does occur. The reality of bureaucratic practice suggests that bureaucracies cause problems as well as solve them. Bureaucracies are expected to help the president carry out presidential policies. In practice, the president depends on the bureaucracies comprising the foreign affairs government to get things done.

The individual source category embraces the values, talents, and prior experiences that distinguish one policy maker from another and that distinguishes his or her foreign policy choices from others. Theories emphasizing the personal characteristics and experiences of political leaders enjoy considerable popularity. This is partly because democratic theory leads us to expect that individuals elected to high public office will be able either to sustain or to change public policy to accord with popular preferences, and because the electoral system compels aspirants for office to emphasize how their administration will be different from that of their
CURRENT ISSUES AND PROSPECTS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH

opponents. However, in the same way that other single-factor explanations of American foreign policy are suspect, we must be wary of ascribing too much importance to the impact of individuals. Individuals may matter, and in some instances, they clearly do, but the mechanisms through which individuals influence foreign policy outcomes are likely to be much more subtle than popular impressions would have us believe. Because of the president’s power and preeminence, it is tempting tithing of foreign policy as determined exclusively by presidential preferences and to personalize government by identifying a policy with its proponents. The conviction that the individual who holds office makes a difference is also one of the major premises underlying the democratic electoral system, as new administrations seek to distinguish themselves from their predecessors. Hence leadership and policy are portrayed as synonymous, and changes in policy and policy direction are often perceived as results of the predispositions of the leadership. Another way to access the impact of individuals’ personal characteristics on their foreign policy behavior is to investigate which behaviors and preferences are associated with particular personality traits and related beliefs. Individuals can be described using a variety of personal characteristics. These eight concepts illustrate how individuals’ personality traits and cognitive characteristics may influence foreign policy behavior. The list is not exhaustive, and some of these factors can work in tandem with others to affect leaders’ policy choices when faced with particular international events. This image of leaders’ psychological motives can easily be exaggerated, as clear differences in motivation and belief are also evident. Even the most self-assured individuals can easily confuse personal identity with the role played and mistake the power conferred by the position for personal power. The next step is to inflate one’s own importance in the overall scheme of things: to think that one has made things happen when in fact things have happened only because of the power one controls, or to assume that, being powerful, one is indispensable. People become elite only because they occupy elite positions and not because, as they sometimes assume, they are inherently special. Individuals playing roles often become, in their own minds, the masks they wear. In this respect the impact of the office on the officeholder makes those in the foreign policy elite more
alike than different. Different individuals often pursue their predecessors’ policies and respond to international events consistently. American policy makers thus routinely display a propensity for incremental change, perpetuation of established routines of thought and action, and preservation of established policies.

Primacy, neo-isolationism, selective engagement, and cooperative security figure prominently in the most recent exchange of ideas as the United States enters a new century and a new millennium. Primacists (Maynes’s controllers) remain committed to maintenance of U.S. hegemony. Neo-isolationists remain a significant voice in the debate about America’s foreign policy priorities. The litany of global challenges has been recited throughout previous chapters. It includes transnational terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, information warfare, international trafficking in drugs and related criminal activities, outlaw states, failed states and festering local ethnopolitical, and regional conflicts that constantly threaten to erupt into wider wars. In the eyes of some, transnational terrorism is a phenomenon that has profoundly changed the character of international politics and America’s role as a world leader. The proper goal for American foreign policy… is to encourage a multipolarity characterized by cooperation and concert rather than competition and conflict. In such a world, order would not be limited to peace based on a balance of power or a fear of escalation, but would be founded in a broader agreement on global purposes and problems. American remains involved in the world, but its involvement is now directed at commercial and ethnic interests rather than national interests. Many scholars and policy makers have joined the long-standing chorus lamenting the role that domestic politics play in the American foreign policy process. Balance sheet on forces now at work at home and abroad on the broad range of opportunities and challenges to contemporary American foreign policy yields no firm conclusions. Our understanding of the sources of American foreign policy—the external environment, conditions within American society, the structural characteristics of the government, the roles occupied by decision makers themselves-leads us to conclude that only here, in the confluence of these forces, can we find the clues that will reveal the nation’s response to the events and challenges of the new century.
The overlapping organizations that comprise the foreign affairs government, while nominally at the president’s command, are neither easily directed nor led, as the role requirements of career professionals reward caution, not innovation. Furthermore, new presidents—often viewed as “transient meddlers” in the business of the people who staff the foreign affairs government—frequently find that their preferences are not top priorities in an environment that equates organizational survival with individual survival. Because the United States is a society-dominant political system, the ability of the president to work his will in Congress ultimately will be influenced by the support his policies enjoy among the American people. At a time of peace and prosperity and no imminent external threat, the American people’s definition of national priorities understandably is driven by domestic concerns. Most of the assumptions made by American policy makers in the immediate circumstances following World War II proved to be remarkably resilient for more than five decades. Arguably they served the nation well. Now, however, the structure of the international system on which those assumptions were based no longer exists. Old solutions may no longer fit new realities. Although past policy has the awesome force of momentum behind it, today the question is whether American leaders have the will to chart new foreign policy directions.

In conclusion, this book provides comprehensive explanation of American foreign policy and certainly it is one of the bright and reliable sources in order to give clear overview. It can be seen that this sixth edition of the textbook has been carefully revised and updated. As in previous editions here we can follow to sufficient analytical and scientific framework. This edition contains new ideas and remarks of the most recent studies in American policy at that period of publication. This book analyzes American foreign policy process and substance. Despite historical, theoretical and conceptual outlines, this book contains five sources: the external (global) environment, the societal opinion and political culture, the governmental setting in which policy making occurs, the roles maintained by policy makers, and the individual characteristics of foreign policy-making elites, which all together assists to make up the mind about foreign policy aims and the methods selected to completely understand them. The book carries on with its long-time
transmission of beliefs and extended knowledge of the American foreign policy’s past, present and estimated future stages, which is based on stimulating careful consideration of recently discovered thoughts in twenty first century.

References:
1. The seventh edition of American Foreign Policy: Pattern and Process written by Eugene R. Wittkopf, Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and James M. Scott