This paper aims to critically appraise optimal patent protection using the expected utility model from the perspectives of governments to balance the motivation and social use of the intellectual property. In order to achieve this aim, the report has presented the working mechanism of governments towards patent protection; use of utility model by governments; past and present academic investigations on the topic; strategizing behavior of governments towards patents and as a brief example, a case of the transition economy. The expected utility model has provided an effective and efficient framework for the development of patent strategy by governments. The essay has noted that due to the differences between industries and their dynamics, it is expected that diverse patent regimes should be followed to balance the social utility and economic utility of the economic actor to engage in research and development.
Ljungqvist, L., & Sargent, T. J. (2012). Recursive Macroeconomic Theory. MIT press.
Varian, H. R. (2014). Intermediate Microeconomics: A Modern Approach: Ninth International Student Edition. WW Norton & Company.
Cerqueti R., & Lupi C. (2016). Risk Measures on Networks and Expected Utility. Reliability Engineering and System Safety, 155, 1-8.
Schoemaker, P. J. (2013). Experiments on Decisions Under Risk: The Expected Utility Hypothesis. Springer Science & Business Media.
Dubois, D., & Guyonnet, D. (2011). Risk-informed Decision-making in the Presence of Epistemic Uncertainty. International Journal of General Systems, 40(02), 145-167.
Friedman, D., Isaac, R. M., James, D., & Sunder, S. (2014). Risky Curves: On the Empirical Failure of Expected Utility. Routledge.
Schuett, F. (2013). Patent Quality and Incentives at the Patent Office. The RAND Journal of Economics, 44(2), 313-336.
Ching, A. T. (2010). A Dynamic Oligopoly Structural Model for the Prescription Drug Market After Patent Expiration. International Economic Review, 51(4), 1175-1207.
Fagerlin, A., Pignone, M., Abhyankar, P., Col, N., Feldman-Stewart, D., Gavaruzzi, T., ... & Stiggelbout, A. (2013). Clarifying Values: An Updated Review. BMC medical informatics and decision making, 13(2), S8.
Conti, A., Thursby, J., & Thursby, M. (2013). Patents as Signals for Startup Financing. The Journal of Industrial Economics, 61(3), 592-622.
Danzon, P., Towse, A., & Mestre‐Ferrandiz, J. (2015). Value‐Based Differential Pricing: Efficient Prices for Drugs in a Global Context. Health economics, 24(3), 294-301.
Dutta, A. (2011). From Free Entry to Patent Protection: Welfare Implications for the Indian Pharmaceutical Industry. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 93(1), 160-178.
Arrow, K. (1992). Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention. In The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic and Social Factors (pp. 609-626). Princeton University Press.
Benoît, C., Norris, G. A., Valdivia, S., Ciroth, A., Moberg, A., Bos, U., ... & Beck, T. (2010). The Guidelines for Social Life Cycle Assessment of Products: Just in Time!. The International Journal of Life Cycle Assessment, 15(2), 156-163.
Boschma, R., & Fornahl, D. (2011). Cluster Evolution and a Roadmap for Future Research. Regional Studies, 45(10), 1295-1298.
Feiwel, G. R. (Ed.). (2016). Arrow and the Ascent of Modern Economic Theory. Springer.
Ellerman, D. (2010). Pragmatism Versus Economics Ideology in the Postsocialist Transition: China versus Russia. Real-World Economics Review, 52(2), 2-27.
Tverdohleb, E. (2012). The Institutional Change in Action: Transitioning to Economic Man. Communist and Post-Communist Studies, No. 45, 363–373.
Ця робота ліцензується відповідно до Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
| Переглядів: 32 | Завантажень: 15 |