DIFFICULTIES OF RECOGNIZING THE SEMANTICS OF SENTENCES IN ENGLISH

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One of the features of modern linguistics is some difficulties in identifying the objects of research directly. It may look strange and even paradoxical, but so far, and to be more precise, by the beginning of the third decade of the XXI century, the desired concept sounds rather vague. And if you look at different ways of revealing the meaning of a word not only from the perspective of recognizing the semantics of individual words or expressions, but also sentences, then the question will appear even more complicated and confusing. Let's try in our theses to "unwind the tangle" of possible complications and contradictions that arise when considering this interesting and relevant problem in modern English linguistics.

It seems to us expedient, first of all, to approach it from the point of view of ontology. What does this mean? First of all, clarify the meaning of individual words in a sentence. To this end, it is necessary to first reveal the nature of words together with the establishment of the factors of their origin, then the development of the mode and the degree of their functioning both in the text and in the system of society. Discussions about where the watershed between speech and language runs have been going on up to the present day. After all, it is possible to reveal the meanings of words in sentences from different sides. It is possible to do this separately, but also as part of expressions and even with a certain language environment, that is, in the text. Modern norms of linguistics recognize the latter as the most effective way. Figuratively speaking, the most important thing here is behind the theory of speech production. The study of speech activity is illegal without clarifying semiotic laws. We come to the conclusion about the importance of determining the ratio of the meanings of words and signs. This is the approach to resolving the ontological nature of the signs themselves.

In linguistics, a "sign" is understood as a "thing", on the one hand, language – as a material element that is included in human activity – on the other hand. As the outstanding scientist of the past A.Leontiev correctly noted, "... the attempt to reveal individual linguistic meanings of words often hides such methods (or operations) that are socially active in nature. From a purely linguistic point of view, theorists, recognizing these meanings/signs, assure that people thereby first learn and then modify the forms of objective reality. In other words, A.Leontiev concludes his thought, "in the separately considered methods of revealing the meanings of words, the ideal forms of existence of the properties of the objective universe, its connections, relationships dictated by cumulative practice are presented transformed and rolled up in the matters of language. That is why it can be confidently stated that when abstracting individual meanings of words in sentences from their functioning in the consciousness of an individual, they pass into the category of socially cognizable reality directly lying behind them" [3, p.54-55]. In our opinion we will pass from this provision to its consequence. Such prominent linguists as A.P. Klimenko, O.V.

Seliverstova, N.Chomsky, V.P. Zinchenko, G.V. Kolshansky and some others are inclined to think about the need for a logical requirement not to build statements in any modern language (including English), "which could truly convey the absurdity of the information given in the sentences, that is, that individual parts of the statements in the sentences would not contradict each other or that the information transmitted in them would correspond to what is already known outside of their linguistic reality" [1, p.84].

And if the above-mentioned scientists agreed in the aspect of these logical requirements for proposals, then from this moment, perhaps, certain discrepancies begin. For example, N.Chomsky believes that "the theory of adequacy in the English language should include, first of all, such rules in which in the sentence (1) "The boy may frighten sincerity"; "Sincerity may admit the boy" would be recognized as anomalous in contrast to the sentences-statements (2) "Sincerity may frighten the boy"; "The boy may frighten sincerity" ("A boy can admire sincerity")' [5, p.74-75], etc. However, it turns out that not all linguists agree with this position. Thus, the perception of sentences, which N.Chomsky titled with the number "1" as "anomalous", according to, for example, O.V.Seliverstova, on the contrary, is determined not by violations of any proper language rules, but "precisely by the fact that they convey information that contradicts what the reader (or listener) already knows about the non-linguistic reality as a whole" [4, p.12-13]. Thus, O.V.Seliverstova proceeds from slightly different criteria for recognizing the semantics of individual sentences in the English language. We will clarify in our paper: in contrast to N. Chomsky's judgments, she essentially deduces the "anomaly of sentences (1) from an elementary illiterate, unprofessional and therefore absolutely incorrect statement. Proving his own position on this score, the scientist gives the following example: "Shakespeare is a bad writer'. It is quite obvious, according to O.V.Seliverstova (and, of course, any knowledgeable reader/ listener) that this expression-sentence does not correspond to the actual state of things in any way. Who can seriously claim that "Shakespeare is a bad writer"? Consequently, the difference actually lies only in the fact that the sentences numbered by N.Chomsky, like the first pair (1), are perceived by all speakers as absurd. Hence their absolute anomaly, inaccuracy in essence.

Since this "anomaly' (or fundamental illogicality) is determined by the transmission of information that clearly contradicts linguistic and semantic reality, then a person who studies English does not necessarily need to know special rules and regulations that allow, for example, the use of an addition with such a verb as "frighten" in postposition to an animate noun only so that they do not build further messages: "The boy may frighten sincerity". Let us explain: in order to construct such a sentence, at our discretion, it is quite enough for the reader (listener, recipient, etc.) to know the meanings of such lexemes as "boy", "frighten", "sincerity", as well as those meanings that will be assigned to the preposition or postposition of the predicate. In other words, the difficulties of recognizing the general semantics of sentences in English can be removed without prejudice to the content thanks to the usual knowledge of the individual lexemes included in it. Of course, this is only one of the possible ways to reveal the meanings of words in sentences, but it is quite suitable for individual cases.

Following the same logical structural scheme, it is possible to objectively construct the corresponding English sentences not only by the construction "predicate + direct object", but also "predicate + indirect object". And the speaker, depending on the purpose of the utterance, independently chooses one or another (first / second) form in the construction of a sentence in English. That is, if the speaker

wishes to inform that a person becomes the object of a direct description, he designates it as a direct complement. On the contrary, if the described person is the addressee of the speech, then the speaker accordingly chooses a construction with an indirect complement. In English, it is easier to demonstrate this by the example of active or passive voices.

Finally, at the end of our paper, we will focus on the following aspect. Valuable observations of scientists are found when distinguishing the *meaning* and *denotation* in the composition of an English sentence, which, it turns out, also presents a certain difficulty. The meaning is the area of the linguistic sign that informs about the denotation. It is curious that in their theoretical judgments, some English scholars do not identify the meaning with the denotation, however, at the conversational level, these two fundamentally different phenomena are often confused.

But, in our opinion, it is still necessary to distinguish between them, objectively reasoning. Especially to remove some difficulties of sentence semantics in English. So, Ch.Fillmore considered it important to distinguish between surface and deep structures. When we pronounce "The door will open" and "The janitor will open the door" [6], we find that "the door" in relation to the verb sounds the same in two sentences, without much difference in the location of the subject – with an intransitive verb and the complement – with a transitive. But in the case of clarifying the nature of the transmitted information, this rule is no longer applicable. After all, in the first sentence we have given, movement is given from an immaterialized point, or rather, from the action of the door itself. In the second case, on the contrary, an action is given, sent from a person. The divergence of the two actions is thus not the same. We propose, following Ch. Fillmore, to choose the first model for analysis in the case of a message indicating the beginning of a movement associated with the action of an object (door) without the participation of any external forces. For example: "Just give a little push and the door will open". Note that for the speaker himself, as a rule, it is not particularly important whether the specified movement is caused by periodic or constant application of external forces: "And I keep on thinking" – "Any minute the door will open and in he'll come".

We come to the conclusion that some of the above-described differences in the formal construction of English sentences may well serve as a means for expressing various information in the text. In other words, differences at the level of the surface structure correlate with individual differences at the level of their deep structure. But the syntactic model does not suffer from this.

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